Abstract. We construct a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme whose security is polynomial-time equivalent to the hardness of the Subset Sum problem. Our scheme achieves the standard notion of indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) and can be used to encrypt messages of arbitrary polynomial length, improving upon a previous construction by Lyubashevsky, Palacio, and Segev (TCC 2010) which achieved only the weaker notion of semantic security (IND-CPA) and whose concrete security decreases with the length of the message being encrypted. At the core of our construction is a trapdoor technique which originates in the work of Micciancio and Peikert (Eurocrypt 2012).
Introduction
Public-Key Encryption (PKE) is perhaps the most basic application of publickey cryptography [10] . Intuitively a PKE scheme allows Alice to encrypt a message M for Bob, given just Bob's public key pk ; the received ciphertext C can be decrypted by Bob using the secret key sk corresponding to pk . Security of a PKE scheme can be formulated in different ways, depending on the assumed adversarial capabilities. The most basic and natural notion is that of indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA, a.k.a. semantic security) [14] ; here we demand that a passive (computationally bounded) adversary only given pk should not be able to distinguish the encryption of two (adversarially chosen) messages M 0 , M 1 .
Whilst already sufficient for some applications, IND-CPA security is not enough to deal with active adversaries. Hence, researchers have put forward stronger security notions. The de-facto standard notion of security for PKE is that of indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks [29] (IND-CCA), where we now demand that an active (computationally bounded) adversary given pk should not be able to distinguish the encryption of two (adversarially chosen) messages M 0 , M 1 even given access to an oracle decrypting arbitrarily chosen ciphertexts. 3 By now we dispose of many PKE schemes satisfying IND-CCA security under a variety of assumptions, including factoring [15] , decisional and computational Diffie-Hellman [8, 6] , and learning parity with noise [18] .
The Subset Sum assumption. Since its introduction, the Subset Sum problem has been considered a valid alternative to number-theoretic assumptions. In its basic computational version, the Subset Sum problem SS(n, q) (parametrized by integers q and n) asks to find a secret vector s ∈ {0, 1} n given a vector a ∈ Z n q together with the target value T := a · s mod q, where both a and s are chosen uniformly at random, and ·, · denotes the inner product. The hardness of SS(n, q) depends on the so-called density, which is defined by the ratio δ := n/ log q. In case δ < 1/n or δ > n/ log 2 n, the problem can be solved in polynomial time [20, 13, 12, 21, 32] . In case δ is o(1) or even as small as O(1/ log n), the problem is considered to be hard. The best classical algorithm for solving Subset Sum is due to [19] , and takes sub-exponential time for solving instances with δ = o(1) and time 2
(ln 2/2+o(1))n/ log log n for instances with δ = O(1/ log n).
One nice feature of the Subset Sum problem is its believed hardness against quantum attacks. At the time of writing, the best quantum attack-due to Bernstein et al. [3] -on Subset Sum requires complexity 2 (0.241+o(1))n to solve a random instance of the problem.
PKE from Subset Sum. The first PKE scheme based on the hardness of Subset Sum was constructed in the seminal work of Ajtai and Dwork [2] , who presented a scheme whose semantic security is as hard to break as solving worstcase instances of a lattice problem called "the unique shortest vector problem" (uSVP). It is well known that Subset Sum can be reduced to uSVP [20, 13] .
A disadvantage of the scheme in [2] (and its extensions [30, 31, 27] ) is that they are based on Subset Sum only in an indirect way (i.e., via a non-tight reduction to uSVP). This limitation was overcome by the work of Lyubashevsky, Palacio, and Segev [22] that proposed a new PKE scheme achieving IND-CPA security with a simple and direct reduction to solving random instances of the Subset Sum problem.
More precisely, the security of the scheme in [22] is based on the assumption that a random instance (a, T ) of the Subset Sum problem is indistinguishable from uniform. Such a decisional variant of the problem was shown to be equivalent to the above introduced computational version (i.e., to the task of recovering s) by Impagliazzo and Naor [16] .
Our Contributions and Techniques
The work of [22] left as an explicit open problem to construct a PKE scheme achieving IND-CCA security with a direct reduction to the hardness of Subset Sum.
Contributions. In this paper we present a new PKE scheme resolving the above open problem. Previous to our work, the only known PKE schemes with IND-CCA security from Subset Sum were the ones based on uSVP [27, 28] (which are not directly based on the hardness of Subset Sum). An additional advantage of our scheme is that it can be used to encrypt an arbitrary polynomial number of bits; this stands in sharp contrast with the scheme of [22] , whose concrete security starts to decrease when encrypting messages of length longer than n log n (where n is, as usual, the Subset Sum dimension). 4 The theorem below summarizes our main result.
Theorem 1 (Main result, informal). For prime
5 p = Θ(m 2 n log 2 n) and q = p m there exists a PKE scheme with IND-CCA security based on the hardness of SS(n, q).
Techniques. Our scheme (similar to the one of [22] ) is based on the decisional variant of SS(n, p m ), where p is a prime and m is an integer. The main observation (also made in [22] ) is that, in case q = p m , the target value T := a · s mod p m written in base p is equal to As + e(A, s) where A ∈ Z m×n p is a matrix whose i-th column corresponds to the i-th element of vector a written in base p, and e(A, s) is a vector in Z m p (function of A and s) which corresponds to the carries when performing "grade-school" addition. This particular structure resembles the structure of an instance of the learning with errors (LWE) problem [31] , with the important difference that the noise term is "deterministic" and, in fact, completely determined by the matrix A and the vector s.
We use the above similarity between LWE and Subset Sum to construct our new PKE scheme, using a trapdoor technique due to Micciancio and Peikert [24] . Essentially our scheme relies on a tag-based trapdoor function, where the trapdoor is associated with a hidden tag. Whenever the function is evaluated w.r.t. the hidden tag, the trapdoor disappears and the function is hard to invert; for all other tags the function can be inverted efficiently given the trapdoor. Using the leftover hash lemma, one can switch the hidden tag without the adversary noticing.
The above technique allows us to prove that our PKE scheme achieves a weaker (tag-based) CCA notion. This means that each ciphertext is associated with a tag τ , and in the security game the adversary has to commit in advance to the tag τ * which will be associated with the challenge ciphertext. 6 In the security proof we first switch the tag associated with the hidden trapdoor with the challenge tag (using the trapdoor technique outlined above). Now, the simulator is not able to decrypt a message related to the challenge tag which allows us to argue about indistinguishability of the PKE scheme.
It is well known that the above weak tag-based CCA notion can be generically enhanced to full-fledged IND-CCA security using a one-time signature scheme [17] . This allows us to conclude Theorem 1.
Efficiency. Let be the length of the messages to be encrypted, and denote by n, p and m the parameters of the Subset Sum problem. The secret key of our PKE scheme consists of a binary matrix of dimension n × m; the public key consists of 3 matrices of elements in Z p , with dimensions (respectively) m × n, n × n, and × n. A ciphertext consists of 3 vectors of elements in Z p , with dimensions (respectively) m, n, and .
Related Work
Pioneered by Merkle and Hellman [23] , the first construction of PKE schemes based on Subset Sum were based on instances of the problem with special structure. All these constructions have been subsequently broken. (See [26] for a survey.)
In a seminal paper, Impagliazzo and Naor [16] presented constructions of universal one-way hash functions, pseudorandom generators and bit commitment schemes based on the hardness of random instances of Subset Sum.
Besides constructing PKE schemes, [22] additionally presents an oblivious transfer protocol with security against malicious senders and semi-honest receivers. The Subset Sum problem has also recently been used to solve the problem of outsourced pattern matching [11] in the cloud setting.
Preliminaries
For two distributions D and D over Ω, D(x) is the probability assigned to x ∈ Ω and ∆[D, D ] := 1 2 x∈Ω |D(x)−D (x)| is the statistical distance between D and D . We denote with x ← X that x is sampled according to the distribution X. If X is a set, then this denotes that x is sampled uniformly at random from X. We say that a function ν is negligible in the security parameter n, if it is asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any polynomial in n, i.e. ν(n) = n −ω (1) . An algorithm A is probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if A is randomized, and for any input x, r ∈ {0, 1} * the computation of A(x; r) (i.e., A with input x and random coins r) terminates in at most poly(|x|) steps.
In the following, we will need to bound the norm on the inner product between vectors. For this, we will use the Hoeffding bound.
Lemma 1 (Hoeffding Bound). For n ∈ N, c ∈ R, let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent random variables in range [a, b], and X := n i=1 X i , then
Subset Sum
Traditionally a Subset Sum SS(n, q) instance is defined as a := (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and a target T := a, s mod q, where the goal is to recover s ∈ {0, 1} n . For a modulus q = p m , Lyubashevsky, Palacio, and Segev [22] gave an alternative description which shows its similarities with the LWE problem more clearly. First they define matrix A ∈ Z m×n p , where a j,i := ai p j−1 mod p. Thus,
where s ∈ {0, 1} n . Notice that when As is the matrix vector multiplication modp, then A s = As + e(A, s) mod p ∈ Z m p . Here e(A, s) 1 := 0, and for 1 < j ≤ m the j-th component of e(A, s) is given by
for carry c j which is recursively defined by c 2 := 0 and
Since c j is small, and moreover it is the only part of e(A, s) j which depends on e(A, s) j−1 , one has that e(A, s) j − c j is bound by the Hoeffding bound. This implies an overall bound on e(A, s) j :
Lemma 2 ([22] Lemma 3.3).
For any n, m ∈ N, prime modulus p and s ∈ {0, 1} n , there exists a negligible function ν :
The main difference between Subset Sum and LWE is that error term e(A, s) is uniquely determined given A and s where as in case of LWE, error e is sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution independent of A, s.
The Subset Sum assumption. A SS(n, p m ) instance has the following distribution:
The challenge is to distinguish
It was shown by Impagliazzo and Naor [16] that this decisional version of Subset Sum is as hard as recovering the hidden vector s.
Re-randomizing Subset Sum. We use a technique introduced by Lyubashevsky [21] allowing to re-randomize a Subset Sum sample. This technique is based on the leftover hash lemma:
Lemma 3 (Leftover hash lemma). For prime p, 2m ≥ n+1+ω(log n + 1)/ log p and polynomial , there exists a negligible function ν :
A Subset Sum sample (A, b) ← D SS(n,p m ) can now be re-randomized to (RA, Rb) where RA is statistically close to uniform given A, b and Rb. Note that (RA, Rb) is not SS(n, p m )-distributed anymore. Given this re-randomization technique, we are able to construct a tag-based trapdoor function [24] and a PKE scheme whose hardness is independent of the amount of simultaneously encrypted bits. Of major significance is the fact that, after re-randomization, the noise is still bounded:
This bound will be crucial to show the correctness of our proposed PKE. For the security of our scheme, we need a stronger statement. 
where the sum is carried out in R. Thus, there is a negligible function ν(n) such that
Tag-Based Encryption
The main motivation behind the concept of tag-based encryption (TBE) comes from the fact that it is possible to transform an identity-based encryption scheme into an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme [5, 4] . Kiltz [17] showed that these transformations already work starting from TBE. A TBE scheme with tag-space T , message-space M, and security parameter n, consists of the following three PPT algorithms TBE = (Gen, Enc, Dec).
Gen(1 n ): Outputs a secret key sk and a public key pk . Enc(pk , τ, M ): Outputs a ciphertext C for M ∈ M, and tag τ ∈ T . Dec(sk , τ, C): Outputs the decrypted message M of ciphertext C with respect to tag τ ∈ T , or an invalid symbol ⊥.
For correctness, we require that for any τ, M and (sk , pk ) ← Gen(1 n ):
Dec(sk , τ, Enc(pk , τ, M )) = M holds with overwhelming probability. As for security, we define the following selective-tag weak CCA game G TBE [17]:
1. Adversary A picks a tag τ * ∈ T . 2. Run (sk , pk ) ← Gen(1 n ). Adversary A receives public key pk and gets permanent access to an oracle which outputs Dec(sk , τ, C) upon input requests of the form QueryDec(C, τ ) for all τ = τ * , and ⊥ otherwise. Given an exponential tag-space, there is a transformation from a TBE scheme satisfying the above notion to an IND-CCA secure PKE; the transformation requires a one-time signature scheme or a message authentication code plus a commitment [17] .
We embed the tags in our proposed TBE using a full-rank differences (FRD) encoding H [7, 1] . This means that H : Z n 2 → Z n×n 2 , τ → H τ and ∀τ = τ ∈ Z n 2 H τ − H τ has full rank.
A Subset Sum Based TBE
For security parameter n, let p = Θ(m 2 n log 2 n) for prime p > 2, and m = Θ(n) for appropriate constant factors. The following three algorithms describe our TBE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) based on SS(n, p m ) with tag space T := Z 
